The 1965 India – Pakistan war was brought to an end on 22nd September 1965 by a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations. The situation on ground as on that day in various sectors was such that India had a markedly upper hand. In Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistani raiders launched through the Line of Control across the entire state under their Operation Gibraltar had been stopped, killed, captured or beaten back . The strategically important Hajipir Bulge had been captured by India. Pakistani armoured offensive under ‘Operation Grand Slam‘ in the Aknoor sector had been beaten back. The Indian 1 Armoured Division had broken through the initial lines of Pakistani defences and was poised inside Pakistani territory, ready to threaten Sialkot. The Indian offensive in Punjab, in the Amtrisar – Lahore sector, was progressing well, with a foothold having been established on the Icchogil Canal. The Pakistani counter-offensive in Punjab, in the Khem Karan Sector, had been blunted and beaten back. Scores of Pakistani battle tanks scattered around Khem Karan and Asal Uttar – some destroyed and others abandoned in perfect working condition – bore testimony to the total rout of Pakistani Armoured Division leading this thrust. Under these circumstances, the ceasefire came as a welcome face saving exit for Pakistani government and Army – which were virtually the same thing.
Subsequently, under the Tashkent Agreement of 10th January 1966, signed between PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan, both forces gave up the territorial gains and status quo ante was ensured. Under the Agreement, the countries agreed –
The death of PM Shastri the same night, hours after signing the Tashkent Agreement, is still shrouded under a veil of myriad unanswered questions. President Ayub continued as a lame duck head of state for another few years before he was finally forced to resign in 1969. For India, the outcome, though not an outright victory, did come as a redeeming factor after the ignominious defeat by China in 1962. The Pakistani side, typically, continued to claim it as a thumping victory, and their populace is still under this misplaced belief that unlike 1971, 1965 war was won by them. Indian commentators have been more realistic in accepting the outcome as a stalemate.
Looking back at the events from the vantage point of half a century later, and the added luxury of a dispassionate perspective via the lens of de-classified CIA documents, some questions remain unanswered. Here are extracts of the relevant CIA Intelligence Memorandum with some key highlights that emerge from underlined text.
Analysis of the document and subsequent events indicate that –
The hostilities were initiated by Pakistan who infiltrated guerrillas led by regular army personnel into Kashmir, and due to any Indian aggression as long claimed by Pakistan.
The end was indecisive, due to a ceasefire which both sides were reluctant to agree to.
India had made substantial gains in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors besides having captured the strategic Hajipir bulge in Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan had ‘contained’ the Indian forces, but were unable to ‘bring them to their knees’. This means that Indian forces had been temporarily halted. They had made substantial territorial gains as above, and if they had even continued to hang on to their ‘contained’ positions, Pakistan couldn’t muster the strength to evict them.
The military cost to Pakistan was substantially higher.
Pakistani public had been led to believe by government propaganda that they were winning the war. An end to the war without any gains in Kashmir was therefore difficult for their leadership to sell to their people.
Bhutto even threatened to pull out of the UN if the Kashmir issue was not resolved.
India’s firm refusal to discuss Kashmir led to his bluff being called.
Under these circumstances, Ayub was considerably weakened, and the document predicts (quite accurately, as subsequent events proved) the threat of secessionism in East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh).
Shastri, on the other hand, had emerged much stronger. Having taken over as Prime Minister after the death of and under the long shadow of Nehru, he would no longer be considered as an insignificant entity after a decisive victory over Pakistan.
All of above indicates that if the ceasefire had not been imposed, India was on the trajectory to a clear victory akin to the one it finally achieved in 1971. Therefore, India’s acceptance of the ceasefire, subsequent concessions at Tashkent and the mysterious death of PM Shastri hours after signing the Agreement remain a mystery unexplained to date. Some of the questions that remained unanswered are –
What prevented India from pressing home its advantage on the battlefield, or even from bargaining hard at Tashkent to gain some advantages rather than settle for status quo ante?
Would an assertive India under a strong leader (as Shastri had proved himself to be) without having to look over it’s shoulders towards a weakened Pakistan be inconvenient to the global power equations as envisaged by the superpowers?
India’s inability to convert the decisive military victory in 1971 into significant political gains begs similar questions.
Who were these vested interests that brought about these outcomes? More importantly, now that India is asserting itself economically, diplomatically and militarily once again, and Pakistan is virtually heading towards a failed state status, would such vested interests not be threatened again? Won’t they use every trick in and outside the book to limit and contain India? Are we seeing signs of this around us, in other forms, in the run up to the 2024 elections? Who are these interests and what is their reach?
Paranoid fancies or viable conjectures – left to your judgement.
All soldiers take great pride in their uniform. It sets them apart as a select group of people who take up arms in defence of their country and are willing to take or give lives in the line of duty. Military uniforms are as old as organised armies. They originated to distinguish soldiers across the world from civilians during times of war and also identify them as those who were permitted to bear arms in times of peace. From being more ostentatious, colourful and flashy in the earlier times, they have evolved to utilitarian and functional attire for the modern battlefield. Traces of the erstwhile pageantry is retained in the ceremonial uniforms such as mess dresses and those worn on ceremonial occasions such as parades and funerals.
Wearing of uniforms has always been governed by very strict instructions, laid down in the dress regulations of each service. To give the uninitiated an idea about the details to which these instructions go down to, here are a couple of pages from the Army Regulations of India Volume VII (Dress) dated 1912.
This would give you an idea about the detail in which what, how and when each article of is uniform to be worn is specified. The current version of Dress Regulations are much briefer and simpler, since the variety and complexity of the uniforms have been simplified. Yet, uniforms of the armed forces continue to be closely regulated both in terms of the specifications and the occasions on which what can or cannot be worn.
After ‘shedding their uniform’ or retiring, veterans understandably continue to retain their love for the uniform they have donned with pride for most of their lives. It is also a traumatic process to transition from a well regulated, orderly environment to the chaos and disorder of the world outside the cantonments. The loss of authority also comes as a blow. From being instantly obeyed, saluted, feted and looked up to for decisions, one is suddenly reduced to being an ordinary joe, not distinguishable from other men on the street. While the majority take this in their stride and adjust, a few find it difficult to shed the trappings of service. Possibly hating the thought of not being distinguishable from the ‘bloody civilian’ next to them, they go to ridiculous lengths to announce to their past to the world at large. This is usually done by wearing some articles of uniform on civilian clothing, particularly during public functions or while appearing on television shows. This disease is more prominent amongst those who retire from ‘star’ ranks. Not only are they keen to display that they are veterans, but also emphasise the high rank they retired from. They do this through embroidered stars corresponding to their ranks on various parts of their clothing.
There is another category of veterans who want to leverage the love that the common people have for the armed forces for furthering their political careers. They use articles of uniform while attending political events and on political posters.
This thread has numerous instances which illustrate the misuse of articles of uniform for various purposes discussed above.
Thread 1 – A senior veteran wearing sidecap indicating his rank to a media event – Another displays his old car flag prominently on the windscreen of his private vehicle. We're all proud of our service in our glorious organisation. There are several dignified and accepted means.. pic.twitter.com/57kMC0wlTa
It is not that veterans are completely barred from wearing uniform altogether. The dress regulations also lay down the forms and occasions on which veterans can wear certain articles of uniform. For instance the wearing of medals / miniature medals are governed by Para 666 of the Regulations for the Army (1987) as under –
While the veterans are no longer under the Army Act and hence these Regulations cannot be enforced, unauthorised wearing of uniform or articles of uniform is also a punishable offence under Section 140 of IPC. In the current security environment there have been instances where terrorists have resorted to wearing military uniforms while carrying out attacks. The army is thus hard pressed to prevent the misuse of military uniform by unauthorised persons. Under such circumstances the misuse of articles of uniform by veterans sets a bad precedent before the public at large. And in most cases, the overt display of military rank and credentials in public by veterans makes them object of lampoon amongst the general public, who are too polite to point it out to them. The onus is therefore on the veteran community itself to stop this crass practice through peer pressure by highlighting such misuse at various fora. And if that does not work, the authorities may have to step in and take appropriate legal measures to enforce the regulations in extreme cases.
Congress scion Rahul Gandhi is about to complete yet another attempt to revive his flagging political fortunes in the form a a countrywide march. As per its official website –
“The aim of this Yatra is to unite India; to come together and strengthen our nation…. to raise their voice against the economic, social and political issues that are dividing our nation today. The yatra seeks to address rampant unemployment & inflation, the politics of hate and division and the over-centralisation of our political system.”
We will come back to this aim, but first let’s see the roles of ‘unity’ and ‘diversity’ in a democratic nation. In a democracy, people make a choice between political parties to govern them based on diversity of views, ideologies and vision. At the end of its term, they evaluate its performance and decide whether to re-elect them or throw them out. Therefore some amount of diversity is inherent in a democratic system.
Now unity – in a nation, there are certain issues on which diversity of views aren’t an option. National security and sovereignty are two key ones.
Coming back to the statement of aim of Bharat Jodo Yatra. “To raise their voice against the economic, social and political issues that are dividing our nation today.” These issues are not dividing the nation, as by definition these difference are expected to be present in a democracy. What, if anything that is dividing the nation is attempts to package these differences as divisive in a generic manner rather than providing a coherent critique of the government’s performance as is expected from a responsible opposition. As for seeking to address “rampant unemployment & inflation, the politics of hate and division and the over-centralisation of our political system.” It’s difficult to understand how this massive tamasha will address unemployment and inflation. About hate and over-centralisation – is it truly an issue, or a narrative being built? That could be left for the people to decide in the next election, which is what the yatra is targeting of course.
But what really rankles is the doublespeak of Congress on the key issues of unity – national security and sovereignty. The recent statements on the Pulwama attack and surgical strikes, damage control notwithstanding, indicates the ambiguity within Congress vis a vis its stance on national security. The glee with which the party has welcomed a documentary by a foreign broadcaster targeting the Indian PM on a matter in which the Supreme Court of India has already given an unambiguous decision shows it is taking our sovereignty lightly. Rahul Gandhi may have walked thousands of kilometres over the past few months, but when it come to unity and diversity, what we would like to see him is walk the talk.
Sometime in January, WhatsApp started showing a pop-up asking me to agree to their updated privacy policy if I wanted to continue using the app beyond 8th February. In the normal course, I would have agreed without giving much thought to it. After all, we don’t really read the User Agreement every time we install or update an app. Like everyone else, I am also blasé about my privacy online – willing to risk the possibility of exposing myself as a tradeoff for the convince of using electronic tools / applications / websites etc. Like most of us, my rationale is “I’ve nothing to hide”. But what irked me about this was the feeling WhatsApp was putting a gun to my head – “Agree by 8th Feb or I’ll pull the trigger”. I decided to look for alternatives to WhatsApp for my messaging / communication needs. A lot of users evidently shared my attitude, since WhatsApp extended the deadline to 15th May. They climbed down further, allowing users to continue using the app even after that date without agreeing to the new terms. As of now it’s not clear whether WhatsApp will back down completely or go through with its threat of blocking users who don’t agree. Currently there is also some back and forth between the government and WhatsApp about the policy. But regardless of the ultimate outcome, I have shifted to alternative apps (Telegram and Signal) for my primary communication needs. During the transition, and till such time WhatsApp doesn’t make up its mind to block users who don’t agree to the new privacy agreement, I’ve made temporary arrangements to cater for my FOMO by using a prepaid number and an old instrument.
I sent out a message to all my contacts informing them about the change, and a large number of them messaged back wanting to know more about the issue. Thinking my concern is shared by many, and my decision probably prompted them to try and understand – “Is it really such a big deal?”, I decided to write this post explaining my reasons and rationale as an easier alternative to responding at length individually, with the aim plus of helping people beyond my contact list also to think through the decision that many must be dealing with right now. A very big disclaimer here – I am not an expert, nor have I gone very deep into the language and implications of the changed agreement. These are just my own thoughts and logic based on the little that I understand.
In a nutshell the changes proposed by WhatsApp are – you are permitting them to share your usage data with Facebook (its parent company). There have been several clarifications by WhatsApp subsequently, possibly to control the bleed of subscribers like me. I found them to be mainly platitudes assuring that the privacy of their users and transparency in dealing with us are their primary concerns, followed by explanation of the initial terms in greater detail. I, for one, haven’t been reassured by this and have not changed my mind.
Some of the ‘FAQs’ about this whole shift away from WhatsApp that I’ve faced are as follows –
Why should I worry, since I don’t use WhatsApp to interact with business accounts (and don’t intend to in future)?
Why should I worry about anyone seeing my messages? I have nothing to hide.
What is the guarantee that Telegram / Signal also won’t come up with similar terms later?
Why worry when as it is we share so much online and all our data is susceptible to hacking?
These are valid questions, all of which apply to me as well. I don’t interact (or have plans to interact) with business accounts on WhatsApp, have nothing to hide, share a lot of information on social media, and am aware there is no guarantee that other apps do not follow in the footsteps and bring in similar measures.But the biggest threat became apparent to me when I realised the degree to which I had become dependent on WhatsApp, purely because everyone is on it. There’s no point of a messaging app unless the person you want to send the message to also has it. This universal dependence is probably what WhatsApp is relying upon, judging by its attempts at ‘gun to forehead’ coercion. Since the dependence would only increase with time, I thought this was a good opportunity to switch before WhatsApp becomes the Hotel California in my phone. Why wait for the dependence to grow, to the extent that one is forced to agree to access even beyond communications with business accounts if they ask us sometime in the future?
I’m also aware of the old adage “If you’re not paying for paying for the product, you are the product.” Incidentally, this didn’t originate in the era of social media as I’d originally thought, but dates back to the 70s where it referred to advertising revenue driven free television channels. Yes, tomorrow Telegram and Signal could also look at monetising their data (your data). After all, the investors in these companies aren’t in it for charity, and would have a revenue model in mind for ROI. But WhatsApp is owned by Facebook who bought it in 2014 for $ 16 billion, and therefore has both greater incentive and greater wherewithal to harvest and use such data, as compared to others like Telegram / Signal due to ‘Network Effects‘. Even if the latter want to, their ability to use that data is limited compared to WhatsApp and Facebook. And tomorrow if they do come up with a similar ‘threat’, I feel I could abandon them and switch to other alternatives at that time.
But what is the actual threat? After all, what do I stand to compromise if someone like WhatsApp / Facebook is privy to my WhatsApp messages? Even if all my messages are mundane and boring? But the first threat I envisage is about giving WhatsApp access to my online transactions. Below is an extract from the revised privacy agreement.
While this is restricted to transactions made using WhatsApp only right now, I’m not willing to take a chance of leaving myself open to WhatsApp gradually becoming more and more blasé about what else they want access to as they come to realise the degree of dependence we have on them. I certainly wouldn’t want them becoming privy to all transactions I make online through my phone, which has all my banking apps and wallets. If WhatsApp / Facebook has access to this data, it’s not as if they themselves will use this for unauthorised access to my bank account to defraud me. But Facebook has suffered data breaches earlier, and will face them in future as well. They are also allowed to sell this data to third parties, who in turn are also susceptible to hacking / data breaches. The banks themselves are susceptible, you may argue. But any loss caused to me through such a breach is the bank’s liability. I’m not sure where the liability for a possible loss to me through a data breach at Facebook or a third party to whom its sold the data will lie – specially if I’ve consented to share the information as above.
Apart from transactions related data, WhatsApp wants to collect the following information –
Certain information is essential for any messaging app to function. But the comparison of the information collected by others vs WhatsApp below is eye opening.
WhatsApp and Facebook use the data they collect to profile each user. By providing more and more data about ourselves to the big tech companies, we are enabling them to refine this profiling of us. This profile is used to show us targeted advertising and filter the content we see on the platforms in an attempt to increase our engagement. To understand the disturbing extent to which this has progressed , I encourage you to read this article. Incidentally, users in European Union have the option of opting out of this agreement without losing any functionality due to their better data privacy laws (GDPR). This itself is indicative of need for legislation for better protection of our data privacy in India too.
Filtering of content based on our profile traps us in echo chambers reflecting our own thoughts and biases. For instance, we mainly see content that aligns with our political leanings, instead of getting conflicting views as well. Social media is where we get most of our news and inputs these days. Since fake news abounds these platforms, and most of us don’t read beyond headlines, these echo chambers are increasingly leading to subtle political indoctrination – mainly as a side effect, but also being capitalised on by political parties. The threat potential of this was demonstrated when Cambridge Analytica allegedly used Facebook data to influence the US presidential elections.
Let’s come back to the bottomline, which I can summarise as follows. The probability of direct or indirect harm by agreeing to the new privacy policy is low, specially when weighed against the short term inconvenience of shifting out of the app altogether. But long term potential harm is a distinct if distant risk, against which I am willing to suffer the short term inconvenience. Specially since my dependence on WhatsApp isn’t so much right now that I would allow it to force me to agree. Getting out now before that dependence grows makes a lot of sense to me.
So even if you don’t (or can’t) quit WhatsApp, I’d advise you to get on Telegram and Signal as well. To stay in touch with people like me who’ve left or are leaving WhatsApp, and also to have alternatives readily available if you do choose to quit.
Sir, I wish to apologize for my absence from the house yesterday. I was anxious to be here because of a number of adjournment motions on a subject which had naturally aroused much interest, but as the house knows, I had to go to Palam just at that time to meet the President of Pakistan. (Gen Ayub Khan had a brief halt at Palam Airport on his way to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and PM Nehru had gone to the airport to meet him) I sent a request to you to be good enough to take up these adjournment motions a day later, that is, today. I wished particularly to deal with these matters myself and so I requested the Defence Minister not to deal with them. I am grateful to you and to the house for postponing consideration yesterday and for giving me this opportunity today.
I can well understand the concern of this house as well as of others about the news that was published yesterday concerning the resignation of the Chief of Army Staff of the Army. That was, particularly in the circumstances existing today, a serious matter. But an element of sensationalism has been given in the newspapers and much has been said there that is not true. I shall endeavour to give an account of the facts as they came to my knowledge.
I have been interested in the Defence Ministry throughout my period of office. For brief periods I have held the defence portfolio. Even otherwise, I have kept myself in touch with its activities not only through the Defence Committee of the Cabinet but also on the personal level. From time to time, I have met the Chiefs of Staff and whenever possible I have taken the opportunity to visit some defence establishments.
About a week ago, I sent for Gen Thimayya in the normal course in order to have a talk with him. When he came to see me I said to him that I had heard that there was some discontent about recent promotions in the army. He gave me an account of what had been done. I shall refer to this later. I was satisfied that these promotions had been made in the regular course through selection boards and there was no element of partisanship or favouritism in them I say this because I find that some reference was made yesterday in the house to political considerations influencing promotions. I think that there is no truth in that charge.
Gen Thimayya then said to me that he was not feeling very happy about various matters connected with the defence ministry. When I enquired further from him he said that it was quite true that during the last two years more work had been done in the defence ministry than in the previous ten years. Many amenities had been given to our men in the army and these had been greatly appreciated. Production work in the ordnance factories had progressed greatly and generally they had had to work much harder than before. He assured me that the army was in fine fettle and the morale of the officers and men was excellent.
Nevertheless, he said he was not happy at the manner some of the work in the ministry was being carried on. He gave me some instances but they were to my thinking rather trivial and of no consequence. I realised that the difficulties that had arisen might be called temperamental. I said I would look into the matter. I spoke later to the defence minister and mentioned rather briefly what Gen Thimayya had told me. I suggested that he might have a talk with the Chief of Army Staff. I gathered later that the defence minister had some talks with Gen Thimayya.
On the 31st August, that is, the day before yesterday, about mid-day I received a letter from Gen Thimayya offering his resignation as Chief of Staff, Army. I was much surprised to receive this as our previous talk had not led me to think that this might happen. Also, it seemed to me peculiarly unwise for this action to be taken in the conditions that prevail in India today.
That evening, that is, on 31st, I sent for him and pointed out to him that his sending me his resignation in the way he did seemed to me not a right thing at all. I advised him to withdraw it and he accepted my advice.
Yesterday morning – 1st September – I saw the announcement in the newspapers. I did not know how this reached the press. I had not mentioned the resignation letter to anyone at all, nor did I mention the subsequent withdrawal of the resignation. I was naturally distressed at the rather sensational publicity given to this because I knew that this would be a matter of great concern to the house.
As I was unable to come here yesterday, I utilised the rest of the day in trying to get some further information and met many of my colleagues as well as officers from the Defence Ministry. I have had further talks with the defence minister and Gen Thimayya. Gen Thimayya subsequently sent me a letter formally withdrawing his previous offer of resignation.
One of the complaints made in this house as well as outside has been about promotions. I went rather fully into this question. There are strict rules governing promotions in the defence services, more especially to the selection posts. I wisht that some method approaching that could be introduced in our civil services also. Selection posts are filled on the basis of merit and not of seniority alone. There ware various selection boards dealing with promotions from Majors to Lieut-Cols. Large numbers of people are dealt with here. Many of these are officers who came in during the last great war and a fairly strict screening is adopted in dealing with them by these boards. Inevitably many are superseded. The method adopted was that 120 of the best men from each year’s commission were selected from Majors to be Lieut-Cols.
Recently, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet made a rule ensuring that every officer in the army could end up as a Lieut Col and obtain a Lieut-Col’s pension. This gave great satisfaction. These recommendations of the selection boards are considered by the Chief of Staff and later by the ministry. Normally, no change is made and the recommendations are adopted as a whole.
I may add this. When I say, “adopted as a whole”, that does not take away the right of the government to make a change in them because ultimately it is the right of the government to make any change in any such recommendation, but as a matter of fact, this right is very seldom exercised in these large numbers of selections.
Different and higher selection boards are set up for promotions to the higher grades of the army like Brigadiers and Major Generals. The selection boards for Major Generals consists of the three Army Commanders (there were only three commands in 1959) and the PSOs. The Chief of Army Staff is the chairman of it. Inevitably many officers are superseded here as the selection is made on the basis of merit and quality of work done. The recommendations of this selection board are placed before the ministry. It is seldom that any change is made by the ministry or the minister in these recommendations. Again, I would repeat that it is not because we have no right to do so. So far as I know, on this occasion no change was made.
Thus, in all these large scale promotions from Majors and Lieut Cols to Major Generals, all the promotions recently made were through highly qualified selection boards who went deeply into each case. These recommendations were accepted.
In the case of promotion from Major Generals to Lieut Generals the procedure is somewhat different. These are supposed to be done ultimately by the government itself, on the recommendations of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff may, and usually does, consult the three Army Commanders. In the present case, a panel of three names was put up by the Chief of Staff. These three were considered by him to be fit to be Lieut Generals and, therefore, worthy of being promoted. There were two tests laid down. One was that the person should be capable of functioning in a staff appointment as Major General, I think. No 1 in the list of three was fully qualified. But there was one difficulty and that was that he had not acutally commanded an infantry division. This, of course, was not his fault; he had had no chance. There was a further difficulty: that the fact that he had not commanded an infantry division may come up later in case the question of further promotion arose. The Chief of Staff, nevertheless, on the whole, favoured No 1 in this connection, though he had recommended Nos 2 and 3 also as fit for promotion as Lieut Generals now and to give immediately a chance to No 1 to command an infantry division, so that he might have that experience and further that as soon as a vacancy occurred he should be appointed Lieut General and given the requisite seniority from now. Thus, he would not lose his seniority by this delay in appointing him as Lieut General. There was no supersession of No 1. If he did not have experience of command of a division now, a difficulty might arise, later when the question of his commanding an army corps arises. The defence minister consulted me as Prime Minister about this matter, and I agreed with him, more especially as No 1 did not ultimately lose anything by this procedure and is ensured of his future.
In all these promotions right up to the top, there was no interference by government, or the ministry, in the recommendations made by the selection boards of the Chief of Staff. The only slight variation made was the one referred above. Thus, the idea that any consideration other than merit came in is completely untrue. Naturally, large number of officers were not promoted, but the decision was of the selection boards. Those who were not chosen naturally felt disappointed. In any system of merit promotion this is bound to happen.
I have stated above that General Thimayya has withdrawn his resignation. No other resignation has been received by me. The facts, as stated above, would indicate that many of the criticisms made are not justified. Nevertheless, the tension that arose lading to certain unfortunate developments was a matter of concern to me. Such things should not happen in the defence services at any time, and more especially when we have to face a serious situation. Temperamental and like differences cannot be allowed to interfere in the vital work which our defence ministry and the defence services do.
There is one other aspect that must always be borne in mind. Under our constitution and our practice, the civil authority is, and must remain supreme. But that civil authority should pay due heed to the expert advice that it receives. During the last two years or so, our defence services and our defence factories have made great progress. The production has gone up greatly and our ordnance factories now dealing with major projects and thus utilising their spare capacity. Certain well deserved amenities have been given to our officers and men in the defence services. And I am happy to say that their discipline and morale are excellent.
The unfortunate incident that has happened recently should not make us forget these basic facts. I should like to pay a tribute to the defence minister for his great energy and enthusiasm which he has put in his work and which has resulted in so much progress. Also, I would like to express my appreciation of the good work done by our officers and men in the new production activities. I intend to maintain my personal contacts with the defence services and help in removing any difficulties that might arise.
The Debate
Acharya Kripalani – The statement of the Prime Minister is good so far as it goes. But, I am afraid, that it will not put at rest the rumours that have been afloat in the public, as well as in the press. There have been charges and counter charges and there are rumours afloat, and the problems involved are of a serious nature. The Prime Minister referred to the healthy and efficient functioning of our armed forces and the public confidence in their capacity to defend the nation in any event of foreign aggression. It is, therefore, necessary that the matters that have become the subject of public controversy be thoroughly discussed in the house. I concede the inconvenience of public discussion, but surely there can be no objection to a secret session of the house where there can be free and uninhibited discussion of the whole matter, in which all sections of the house, including the members of the ruling party, can participate freely. This is the only way in which the clouded atmosphere of uncertainty can be cleared and public confidence in the defence forces which has always existed in the country can again be restored.
Shri Ranga – I am glad to have this assurance from the Prime Minister that the threatened resignation of General Thimayya has been withdrawn. It is rather strange that the Prime Minister, strangely enough, failed to pay the same kind of tribute to General Thimayya and other Chiefs of Staff, as he has paid to his colleague Shri Krishna Menon. I sincerely hope he will take an early occasion to make good this very important omission. I do not claim to know much about the defence services. But I do know that many people who are in the know of things have come to form a very high opinion indeed of the competence, sense of patriotism and sense of duty of General Thimayya. He has rendered great services to our nation. Other nations have paid tribute to his services when he was working on our behalf on the Korean front, to mention only one fact. It is most essential that we try our best to maintain the morale of the defence forces.
I agree with the Prime Minister that the civil authority must be supreme. We have had that great example of the relations between President Truman and General MacArthur. I give it all importance that is due to it. We want to maintain similar relations in this country also. But, at the same time, we want to be assured that the Prime Minister would be as keen about maintaining the prestige of the Chiefs of Staff as he seems to be anxious to maintain the prestige of his colleague in this house.
Mr Speaker – I do not propose to allow a long discussion on this subject, in view of this statement. Yesterday when Acharya Kripalani and other hon. Members gave notice of some adjournment motions I gave opportunity to each hon member who tabled the motion to say a few words. We waited for the hon Prime Minister to come and make a statement. It is now for me to decide whether I should just disallow the adjournment motion to be discussed in the house or whether I should give my consent to the adjournment motions being raised here. I have heard sufficiently….
.
.
(There proceeds a discussion on a point of order about whether the motion can be disallowed. Procedural discussion not of relevance to the issue at hand has been omitted)
Shri Ashok Mehta – The fact remains that the Chief of Army Staff had tendered this resignation. He may have withdrawn it, that is another matter. So, here is a matter which is of urgent public importance. That fact has not disappeared. As Acharya Kripalani pointed out, we might discuss it in camera… We are quite prepared for it if that is the view of the hon Prime Minister. But merely because the hon Prime Minister has stated what he considers to be the version of the facts as he sees them, surely the rest of the house is not automatically satisfied. The adjournment motion must be permitted or we must be allowed to say whatever we have to say now or a special opportunity must be given to us. This is not a matter on which the hon Prime Minister has the last word having said what he has said.
Raja Mahendra Pratap – I beg to say this is very serious. Once glass is broken, even if it si joined again it remains broken. When the resignation has come from the Commander-in-Chief it is a very serious question. I beg to suggest that Shri Menon may be given the Foreign Office portfolio.
Shri Frank Anthony – One point that I wish to underline is this. As my hon friend, Shri Ashok Mehta has said, the hon Prime Minister has accepted the fact that General Thimayya had submitted his resignation. Now I do not know whether you will be pleased to call for the letter of resignation. I submit with great respect that until the phraseology of that letter of resignation is before us neither you nor the house can decide whether the issues involved were of a serious, critical or a trivial character. I personally find it impossible to believe that a person of the status and character of General Thimayya would have submitted his resignation on trivial personal reasons. Therefore I feel that is letter of resignation must come before us. I agree with Acharya Kripalani and feel that something very serious has happened in the defence ministry. I am not pointing my finger at anyone. I feel that in the interest of the house and of the country, we should have a discussion. If necessary, it may be an in camera discussion.
Shri HN Mukherjee – Mr Speaker, sir, I am rather disturbed to note the trend of the discussion which has followed the statement given by the hon Prime Minister… The hon Prime Minister has told us that the Chief of Army Staff, after having put in his resignation, has been persuaded to withdraw it. The hon Prime Minister has told us very rightly that the civil power is the supreme authority in this country under any kind of acceptable democratic form of administration. Free India has developed a tradition of coordination and cooperation between the civil power and the military arm. The hon Prime Minister has told us that for temperamental and other reasons , some resignations were sent to him in a kind of huff and those resignations have been withdrawn. It stands to reason, particularly at a time when we all appear to be concerned about the defence of our country, that we should not be speculative over questions regarding the possible reasons behind the back of the mind of the Chief of Army Staff, when at a particular point of time he was persuaded to offer his resignation even though he has later on been persuaded on much better grounds to withdraw it. On the contrary, I feel that if there is any tenable subject for discussion, it is this subject, namely that it is very perturbing to the state of this country that the news of the Chief of Army Staff’s resignation percolates to the press and is exploited by certain elements in our country for publicising that there is a kind of a particular partisanship in the administration which militates against the proper cooperation between the civil arm and the military arm. It is that particular aspect of the matter which requires, if anything, to be discussed in this house in a secret or open session; I do not care what. … I want to get from the hon Prime Minister another reassurance in regard to the position which we are going to uphold in this country, that is, that there is supremacy of the civil power and that there is continuing coordination between the civil arm and the military arm and that there should be steps properly taken to prevent the kind of leakage which has led to this sort of sensation mongering and which even finicky hon friends of mine have taken recourse to.
Acharya Kripalani – Yesterday one of our communist hon friends, very vocal, said: “We only want to say that when the hon Minister replies, we should like him to say whether there is any significance in the fact that General Ayub is coming today, this gentleman, Thimayya, offers his resignation today and there is a whole scouting of the affair by Cariappa. We should like to have an answer.”
This is what our communist friend says, these are the allegations made that this action was taken at a time when General Ayub Khan was coming here and that General Cariappa is involved in the matter. All these allegations and counter-allegations are being made, and we must know what truth there is in all this. If there is any truth in this contention, I think there must be a court-martial of our General. It is not a matter which can be blurred over simply like this… when such charges are being made against General Cariappa.
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru – May I say something, to begin with, in answer to Prof Ranga? He said that I ought to have referred in terms of appreciation to General Thimayya in this note. As a matter of fact, I have referred to army officers and men, and I think General Thimayya is a very gallant and experienced officer who has done very good service to this country. But I do not congratulate him for his letter of resignation. That is perfectly clear.
Shri Ranga – You have congratulated the wrong man then. Why have you asked him to withdraw his resignation?
Shri Vajpayee – Ask General Thimayya to resign, that is all.
Shri Braj Raj Singh – It is a very serious matter. If he thinks that he ought not to have resigned, then the resignation should not have been withdrawn.
Shri Ashok Mehta – It is a very anomalous position.
Shri Ranga – It creates a new position. He has asked for the resignation to be withdrawn and he is not prepared to pay the same tribute to him that he has paid to his minister. Either his tribute to the minister is wrong or the other one is wrong.
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru – Mr Speaker, I do not know why some hon members on the opposite side are somewhat excited about this matter. I said, and I repeat that General Thimayya and our senior officers, especially Chiefs of Staff, are people who have done good service, whose experience, whose gallantry we have appreciated, and we appreciate. And that is why we have got them there. Otherwise we won’t have them there. It is because we appreciate their services that we have put them there. That is why I went out of my way to get him to withdraw that letter. But that has nothing to do with my remark that I do not congratulate him, or anybody, for sending a letter of resignation. Let that be quite clear. It is and it was a most extraordinary thing to do. I have said only mildly what I have said.
I say, whatever the circumstances, it was an extraordinary thing to do. The house should realise this. This kind of thing is not often done, normally speaking, or abnormally speaking. Therefore I said, having given my due need of praise to General Thimayya, as I said in my statement presently, that resigning at this stage, at this moment, was not a right thing to do.
Shri Ashoka Mehta asks, why is it condoned? I do not condone it. Who said I condoned it? I have said that I think it was a wrong thing. But many wrong things are done, whether in the flush of the moment or whatever it is, have been pointed out that it is a wrong thing, and one does not pursue a man for that when he has many virtues, when he has served the state in many ways and is still serving.
Acharya Kripalani referred to some remarks made by some other members opposite on the last occasion. If I may say so with all respect, they were not at all proper remarks, about General Ayub Khan and all that. Many things were said yesterday which, I submit, were not proper, this way or that way. For instance, Acharya Kripalani himself talked about political considerations in regard to promotions. I invite Acharya Kripalani to come and see the fiels of every man promoted, himself. I invite him to come and see them.
Acharya Kripalani – May I say that while I was speaking, and you corrected me I said that this was what was being said, though I do not know the real truth. I have no reason to disbelieve the Prime Minister. But it is not my charge. It is the charge that is made in the press and that is made by the public. And you remember sir, I have said in a democracy we have to give some consideration to public opinion, however misguided it may be, and also to the press and you said ‘yes’.
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru – Acharya Kripalani is a respected leader of a respected party. He is not either the public press or a public meeting in Ramlila Grounds. He is not the mirror, I hope, of every rumour that is thrown about in the city of Delhi or elsewhere.
It is quite right for him to draw attention. But I invite him here and now, and any one else in this house to come and examine every file on promotions because….
Acharya Kripalani – May we have the letter – if it is so plain – the letter of resignation? Let there be a secret discussion if necessary. I don not want any public discussion of this matter. I make this suggestion very humbly so that every member of this house, even a congressman, may be able to speak, freely, which he cannot do here.
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru – I am dealing, sir, with the points, separately, and I am venturing to suggest – because this was Acharya Kripalani’s point, whatever the basis of his information was, that promotions have been made for political considerations – I invite Acharya Kripalani, or any committee of the house appointed by you to go and look at every file dealing with promotions. Here is an open invitation, sir, so that this matter may be dealt with thoroughly and fully, which is far better than any discussion elsewhere. Go to the source, form your own opinions; I will not be there, see the files.
Now Acharya Kripalani has suggested an in camera debate. It is rather unusual in such matters to have debates, in camera or other. But I accept his invitation, but no in camera debate, but a public debate. Talking about an in camera debate with five hundred members present here is rather stretching the term. But if there is going to be a debate about these matters, army matters, if people want it, it is unsusual. I would not suggest it, but I do not wisht to come in the way if hon members feel like that. But I will not have an in camera debate but have a public debate.
(The discussion went back and forth for some more time with each repeating their own points made earlier, and speaker disallowing any further discussion).
Appointment of CDS and setting up of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) under him within the Ministry of Defence is a long overdue, ground breaking reform undertaken by the Modi government. The need for such an institution to provide single point military advice to the government had been repeatedly talked about since independence, specially in the aftermaths of the 1962 and Kargil wars. The government must therefore be lauded for having implemented it, overcoming whatever obstacles the bureaucracy (civil and military) must have cited to previous governments to block the move. It is imperative that its early performance and outcomes justify the long gestation and labour pains endured for the birth of this nascent organisation, or else its very existence and utility can once again be called into question. However, recent decisions announced by the DMA seem to indicate a warped prioritisation of issues it is concerning itself about and undue haste in taking irrational decisions without deliberations about their impact. The latest amongst these is the decision to substantially cut down the pensionary entitlement of officers who opt for Pre-mature Retirement (PMR).
To fully fathom the absurdity of this proposal, we need to understand a little more about the cadre management challenges peculiar to officers in the armed forces. Operational imperatives dictate a pyramidical hierarchy amongst the rank of officers. Challenges in performance of junior leadership roles necessitate employment of larger number of young officers vis a vis other organisations like civil services, police and Para Military Forces (PMF), where these subordinate roles can be adequately performed by promotees with an older age profile or subordinate cadres. However, there are no such alternatives to young officers leading troops into battle – a practice who’s efficacy in winning battles has been proven time and again, from 2/Lt Arun Khetrapal in 1971 to Maj Vikram Batra in 1999. Hence we need to induct a large number of young officers at the entry level. But due to organisational structure, there aren’t enough positions in ranks of Colonel and above to accommodate them. Barely 50% of a batch of officers who get commissioned make it to the first selection grade rank of Colonel. The rest, at about 16 – 17 years of service and 36-37 years of age, become ‘superseded’ or ‘Non-Empanelled’ (NE). It must be understood that this is not an indication of their lack of competence, but merely an organisational constraint of limited number of vacancies. This pyramid gets even steeper for promotions beyond Colonel.
“Management” of NE officers is a key challenge faced by the Military Secretary’s Branch, the HR mangers of the Army, and a number of studies have been carried out on this. There are a limited number of meaningful appointments that can leverage the full potential of the NE officers, and most of the times they end up doing mundane administrative duties often under officers who were once junior to them. Absence of meaningful assignments and lack of promotional avenues makes keeping them engaged, motivated and productive extremely difficult. There have been several proposals for parallel absorption of some of these in PMF or civil administration, but none have yielded results, possibly due to resistance from affected cadres. Aware of this gloomy prospect, a large number of NE officers opt to take PMR around 20 years of service, once they are assured of pension. It is notable that a large number of officers who made such career transitions are doing extremely well on the civvy street. This is a win – win for the individuals and the organisation, as there are fewer of NE officers left to “manage” and individuals who leave are free to fulfil their aspirations of professional growth elsewhere.
The new proposal by DMA reduces the pensionary entitlement of such officers by half. Shri Bipin Rawat, Chief of Defence Staff and Secretary DMA is quoted as saying that the aim of the move is “reduction in pensions of personnel taking premature retirement” and to deter the “technically-qualified personnel in armed force services who have an excellent opportunity outside seek early retirement with pension.” One seriously hopes that Shri Rawat has been wrongly quoted in the linked article by his country cousin Manjeet Negi a journalist with a Hindi news channel because if not, it casts serious doubt about the competence of decision making apparatus within the DMA. Let’s examine each of the reasons cited above to substantiate this apprehension.
Let’s first demolish the first reason – reduction in pensions of persons taking PMR. If Lt Col A takes PMR today with 20 years of service and approximate age of 41 years, at a salary of Rs 100, he will get a basic pension of Rs 50 for the rest of his life. If he doesn’t opt for PMR, he will continue to get a salary of Rs 100 for another 16 years till he superannuates at 57 years of age. Add to this his allowances (rations, accommodation, transport, LTC, Composite Allowance etc), and his yearly increment. A back of the envelope calculation indicates his basic salary when he retires 16 years later will be Rs 256. He would thus be entitled to a basic pension of Rs 128 per month for the rest of his life. So the additional cost to the state is roughly 2.6 times for the duration he is drawing salary plus allowances and 2.14 times thereafter. WHERE IS THE SAVING?
The second reason – to deter the technically-qualified personnel in armed force services who have an excellent opportunity outside seek early retirement with pension. At the first instance, it sound outright vindictive. You are forcibly stopping someone who has an “excellent opportunity outside”, even though you can’t offer similar career progression within the organisation. Let’s be charitable and assume this is not sheer vindictiveness, but organisational interest. Is there a need to reduce the pension entitlement across the board to retain key talent? The answer is no, because PMR is not given as a matter of course, but is subject to approval by Army HQ. So if the services of specific qualified individuals are considered valuable, they can be refused PMR while majority of others who will be reduced to mundane duties for next 16 years can be allowed to leave with dignity plus their entitled pension and fulfil their professional aspirations elsewhere. SPECIALLY BECAUSE THIS RESULTS IN AN OVERALL SAVING TO THE STATE as explained above.
The proposals of the DMA are predicated on two basic assumptions – officers seeking PMR are driven solely by financial motives, and that the implementation of proposals will result in saving to the state. Both are flawed, since the miniscule number of technically qualified talent with “excellent opportunities outside” will still leave because the “excellent opportunities” will provide compensation that will more than compensate for the reduced pension. The second assumption has already been disproved above, as the corresponding increase in government expenditure on salaries in the short term, and a much heftier pension bill in the long term will result in an increase rather than decrease in overall government spend on implementing these proposals.
Another aspect that the government needs to consider seriously is the wide ranging angst that such proposals cause amongst the rank and file of the armed forces as well as the veteran community. Since the present government has an overwhelming support of this demography, irreparable political damage is being caused to the ruling party by the hasty and ill advised decisions by the CDS.
The obvious flaws in the proposal gives rise to questions about competence of the present set up at the DMA to render sound advice to the government. At a time when trouble is brewing on our Eastern border with an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with Chinese forces in Ladakh, and severe pressing challenges facing the armed forces, it is questionable why the DMA is occupying itself with issues of questionable benefit. Such follies give rise to fear about the present set up ending up undermining the very institution of CDS and DMA due to lack of competence and narrow vision amongst people selected to man the vital organisation at its nascency.
An explainer on the Indo-Nepal border dispute, based on articles /open source inputs. Received from a friend on social media
Historical Background
· Anglo-Nepal Treaty of Sugauli of 1816. The treaty determines the Kali river as the western boundary between British India and Nepal. Nepal has produced an East India Company map from the archives to show that the British considered the tributary of the Kali River, the Limpiyadhura, as its main channel. But a map drawn up in 1879 after surveys had been carried out shows the boundary along a ridge just west of the Tinker Pass. As per this and later official British maps and what India claims, Kali River originates from a natural spring at Kalapani, where it is joined by a rivulet flowing down from Lipulekh Pass. This was not challenged then nor at any time subsequently until after 1990. In fact, Nepali maps have all along reflected the same alignment. Some Nepali journalists and scholars now argue that the monarchy, first under King Mahendra and later under King Birendra, was reluctant to raise this issue with India for fear of Indian reaction.
· 1950s India in the early 1950s, set up, with the consent of Nepal, a string of military-cum-police posts along the Nepal-China border after the Chinese occupied Tibet. There were either 17 or 18 posts altogether and they remained in place until 1969. In that year, Kirti Nidhi Bisht, the Nepali Prime Minister, on the instructions of King Mahendra, asked Indira Gandhi to withdraw all these posts from Nepali territory. This was done but the Indian post at Kalapani was not in the Nepali list. When this is pointed out to Nepal, the answer is that Mahendra was being sensitive to India’s security concerns vis-a-vis China and hence allowed an act of generosity to let India hold on to Kalapani and access to Lipulekh Pass.
India and China concluded an agreement in 1954 for trade and transit between India and Tibet and among the six border passes listed for the purpose, Lipulekh was included. There was no protest from the Nepali side. The first time that Nepal protested formally was in 2015 when India and China signed an MoU for conducting border trade between the two countries through Lipulekh Pass.
· 1960s China and Nepal reached a border agreement in 1961. Article 1 in the agreement describes the western extremity of the China-Nepal border “starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinker River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu(Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinker River on the other, thence it runs south-eastward along the watershed.” This agreement has been demarcated and there exists Pillar 1 on ground which marks this starting point at the western extremity, and is located at Tinker Pass, well east of Lipulekh Pass.
Politics of Nepal
· Politics in Nepal survives on anti-India sentiment. Nepalese PM, Oli was initially considered favourably disposed to India. Many now feel he wants to leave his legacy by raising the issue of Kalapani-Lipulekh. China’s interference in Nepalese politics and their successful attempt to merge the rival communist parties the CPN-UML and the UCPN (Maoist) to form the Nepal Communist Party (NCP).
· Indian Interest Kalapani has strategic value to India, besides economic logic.
· China’s Position 2015 India-China statement of 2015: “the two sides agreed to … expand border trade at … Lipu-Lekh pass.” Crystal clear: Beijing implicitly recognized Indian sovereignty over Lipulekh, disputed with Nepal.
May-June 2020
· RM inaugurated a new 75-km track to Lipulekh, on May 8, which will now be the shortest route to Kailash Mansarovar for Indian pilgrims.
· COAS’s statement has sparked a furore in Nepal after he hinted at China’s hand behind Kathmandu’s decision to lodge a complaint against the new road.
· Prime Minister KP Oli statement – China has clarified that its agreement with India to open a link road through the Lipu Lekh pass does not affect the outstanding boundary questions between Nepal and India.
· PM Oli has made statement considered offensive and derogatory to India (relating to national emblem etc)
· 20 May – Nepal released a map which includes Indian territory as part of Nepal.
· Parliamentary Moves in Nepal Initially Madhesi parties tried to block the move, subsequently consented. Now a constitutional bill to amend the map has been tabled in the Nepalese parliament, which is likely to pass, considering the support it has got from all the parties.
· Nepal has sought Foreign Secretary level talk (even if a virtual one).
· India’s Option As per one media report – act tough with Nepalese ldrs but enhance people to people contact.
While the sepoy uprising of 1857 remains the best-known mutiny in the history of British Raj in India, there have been several others, notable being the mutiny by Naval ratings in Mumbai in 1946. However, one of the earliest ones, and one about which very little has been written, was the ‘White Mutiny’ of 1776. As evident from the label, it was the British officers and men who were up in arms against the authority, which was wielded at this time, as in 1857, by the East India Company rather than the crown. The mutiny was centered around the garrison town of ‘Monghyr’ – now known as Munger, a district in the state of Bihar, also famous for a fictional television character hailing from here with a proclivity for daydreaming – ‘Mungeri Lal ke Haseen Sapne’.
The Fort at Monghyr
The root of discontent among the British troops of the East India Company that led to this mutiny was the curtailment of the ‘bhatta’ (allowance) that they had been receiving up unto this time. This allowance was paid in addition to their regular salary when they were ‘on the march’ or in field i.e away from their permanent location. After the battle of Plassey (1757), the victorious Company under Lord Clive had installed Mir Jaffar as the Nawab of Bengal in place of Siraj ud-Daula as a reward for betraying the dethroned Nawab in the battle. In return, Mir Jaffar agreed to pay the cost of the Company’s army, even doubling the ‘bhatta’ to ingratiate himself with his benefactors. But shortly thereafter the Company outmaneuvered Jaffar himself by signing the ‘Treaty of Allahabad’ with the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II in 1756, under which the Company received the ‘Diwani’, or direct rights to collect taxes on behalf of the Emperor for Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The flip side of this was that henceforth the Company would have to pay for its own army in the presidency. It promptly decided to withdraw the largess of double ‘bhatta’ now that it was footing the bill. The sudden loss of income caused resentment amongst those affected.
The Company’s forces at the time consisted of three brigades, one each at Bankipore (in modern Patna), Allahabad and ‘Monghyr’. The officers of the Monghyr Brigade, under Lt Col Sir Robert Fletcher, decided to resign en masse on 1st July 1776 unless the allowances were restored. They were in correspondence with the officers of the other two brigades, who were also supposedly in agreement with this plan. The officers of the First (Monghyr) Brigade wrote a letter to Captains Fred Smith and Thomas Pearson who were serving on the staff of General Carnac, urging them to join their cause. The letter read as follows –
Gentlemen,
We are not to inform you, that all the officers here, and those at Patna and Allahabad, (except a few, and those pimps to power too) have resolved to resign their service the first day of May next, unless the batta is restored to what it was in July and August 1763; and request that you will concur with us in refusing to serve but upon those terms. This is no hasty ill-conducted scheme, but the settled resolution of the THREE BRIGADES, who are, to a man, resolved to send every officer to everlasting Coventry, who refuse to join in a cause so just and honourable. We therefore beg that you will, immediately upon receipt of this, transmit your sentiments to some of your friends here, who may communicate them to us. We further beg, that you will consider maturely on this subject before you come to any resolution; for depend upon it, we are determined to go through with it, at the risque (sic) of life, fortune, friends, and ever thing that is dear and sacred. The gentlemen at Moradbaug may be able to inform you of material circumstances. Till we have your answers, we are truly and sincerely
Your friends
The First Brigade
Monghyr
27 April 1766
News of the brewing mutiny reached Clive before it could actually be set into motion, and he set off to Monghyr himself to quell the revolt before it could begin. He sent forward some of his trusted officers including Captain Smith, to prevent the situation from getting out of hand before he reached.
Smith reached Monghyr on 12th May at night and found the British officers in a rebellious mood – drinking, singing and beating drums. He managed to requisition reinforcements in the form of two ‘native’ battalions from Kharagpur just in time as the European battalion broke into open rebellion on 14th May. Smith pre-empted them by getting the reinforcing native battalions to take possession of the artillery guns of the ‘saluting battery’ located on a dominating hillock from which they dominated the barracks of the European battalion. The rebellious troops, who had taken up arms and were preparing to join their officers when they found themselves face to face with bayonet wielding sepoys of the native battalions. Smith threatened the potential rebels with dire consequences unless they returned to their barracks. Their commander, Lt Col Robert Fletcher, who’s stance and loyalties had been somewhat ambiguous so far, also urged them likewise. There was some discussion between him and his officers, who had been heartened at the news of their troops coming out in their support. But the commanding officer refused their entreaties to join them in their protest, and ordered all the officers to leave the garrison immediately.
Lord Clive arrived at Monghyr the next day, but by now the mutiny was already over. He addressed the troops and announced that those guilty of mutiny would face the consequences under law. The exiled mutinous officers were ordered to report to Calcutta to await trial. The officers and sepoys of the two Indian battalions who were instrumental in suppressing the mutiny were awarded with a special commemorative medal for the action. Subsequent investigations revealed that Lt Col Sir Robert Fletcher was actually the chief instigator. Despite threats, no legal action was taken against the rebel officers, most of whom including Fletcher were re-admitted into the Company’s army.
Medal Awarded to Indian Troops who Quelled the Mutiny
As for Monghyr / Munger, it soon ceased to be an important garrison town, but by virtue of its location and purity of its air, was used as a sanatorium for the British troops.
When I joined my Regiment in 1989, amongst the first few mandatory requirements as part of my initiation, as instructed by my senior subaltern, was memorising the names of all the Commandants and Risaldar Majors of the Regiment since it’s raising. Once I could rattle off these names even in my sleep, I was handed the list of every officer who had been commissioned into the regiment before me to memorise as well. Fortunately for me, my regiment was just 17 years old when I had joined, so the tasks were not as difficult as it was of those of my coursemates who had joined outfits over 200 years old. Because, as I found out when we exchanged notes a few months later during our Young Officers course, similar orders had been passed to all of us youngsters. Over the course of the next few years, I had the privilege of personally meeting almost all the officers and most of the Risaldar Majors who’s names were now an indelible part of my rote memory. The importance accorded to its veterans is the mark of a good Regiment, is something I learnt as I grew in service. Regimental traditions and linkages with the past are an important ingredient of espirit de corps of the forces, and veterans of any unit are the living link between its present and past. And what is true for a unit as a microcosm, is also true for the army as a whole too.
Given the inherent discipline and ethos of the armed forces, coupled with a recent downward trend for tolerance of professional dissent of any kind, the availability of feedback to those at the apex is restricted to that received from a limited circle of close advisors on his personal staff. More often than not, these filter unpalatable inputs, no matter how relevant and significant. Subordinates down the chain of command have very limited formalised means to express their opinions on issues affecting them directly. The archaic system of expressing them formally via Sainik Sammelan points, Quarterly Staff Intelligence Report (QSIR) points, points for the Army Commanders Conference, or, in extreme case, through Demi Official letters or the Redressal of Grievances (ROG) mechanism, are not only unsuited for the current day and age, but have also proved ineffective in terms of any results achieved. Serving officers cannot, of course, take to social media to air their grievances publicly – at least not without serious repercussions. In such an environment, the veteran community serves as a vital feedback mechanism. Given their continued integration in the social fabric of the armed forces even after retirement, veterans are in a suitable position to gauge the pulse of the rank and file.They are not constrained by service rules, nor tied down by fear of consequences of voicing their opinion on their professional progression. They do not, therefore, hesitate in calling a spade a spade.
In the recent past, a large number of decisions by the service headquarters have been extremely unpopular with the serving as well as veteran community. Initially, it was a general belief that these decisions were being forced upon the army, with the service headquarters being guilty, at most, of not taking a vehement stand against them. Being inimical to service conditions and morale of serving soldiers, and in some cases also the veterans, each of these received a lot of negative coverage on social media. Yet, the criticism was mainly aimed at the government / bureaucracy in the Ministry of Defence. But it slowly began to emerge that it was the Army headquarters, and more specifically the COAS, who was behind some of these decisions. For example, there was an embargo on army officers travelling on temporary duty, even to cities like Delhi or Mumbai, from staying in hotels – something that all government officers including the forces are authorised to do. Ostensibly this was to “avoid officers meeting contractors and exchanging brief cases in hotels” as the COAS was reported to have said. The ceiling on purchase of cars from the CSD was another move initiated by the COAS, which was widely criticised as unnecessary and regressive. The latest in such decisions is the removal of income tax exemption to veterans in receipt of disability pension. This came to light through an announcement via a CBDT circular, and immediately caused an uproar. When the Finance Ministry came under criticism for this senseless decision, the minister Mrs Sitharaman revealed in a tweet that the decision was taken on the recommendation of the Army headquarters. The senselessness of this decision has been talked about in detail by Gen Cardozo and Gen Oberoi, both distinguished disabled veterans, and bears no repetition here. As the criticism against the Army headquarters and the COAS reached a crescendo post this decision, they reacted in a characteristically knee-jerk manner by ordering all serving officers to leave social media groups that included any non-serving personnel including veterans.
These instructions were initially met with a sense of disbelief, with majority of those affected preferring to wait for official instructions instead of going by media reports. But as the order appears to have trickled down, we see serving officers sheepishly exiting regimental and coursemate groups wherever they include veterans, in compliance with the unequivocal firman. The Army headquarters, through articles by friendly journalists, have attributed this crackdown to incidents of security breaches (including a reported case where an officer clicked the photograph of a marked map and sent it via WhatsApp to another officer). Yet, this lame explanation is cutting no ice with either the serving or veteran community, who are convinced that the aim of this is to isolate the former from the outspoken criticism by the latter in such groups.
There is no question in anybody’s mind that security concerns are paramount for the armed forces, and that social media apps, and large groups which include unknown members, could pose a potential threat if sensitive information is posted on them. But there is already a comprehensive policy regulating social media usage by service officers in force and being complied with for years, which is also periodically revised to cater for technological changes. Besides, WhatsApp groups are possibly the least likely platforms for leaks – deliberate or inadvertent – as compared to one to one messages. Any information of security value inadvertently posted on a group would be noticed and pointed out by others, while someone planning a deliberate leak would be stupid to do so on a group. So no right minded individual would buy the explanation as this being the reason behind the banning of groups. It has been done with the express purpose of separating serving personnel from veterans. Which is sad, given the role of veterans in the social fabric of the organisation described earlier.
The series of decisions and accompanying comments / reasons point to an alarming crisis of confidence between the COAS and his command – “officers accepting suitcases from contractors in hotels”, “how can officers afford expensive vehicles” or “large number of undeserving cases are getting disability pensions by faking”. Either the thought is that the bulk of serving and retired personnel in the army are thieves and liars, or the organisation has fallen back to the juvenile practice of collective punishments – withdrawing the benefits and facilities of the entire force to punish a few black sheep who could be indulging in corruption or fraud.
Sadly, the trust deficit is working both ways, with the actions of the COAS being suspect in the eyes of those affected as being motivated out of a desire to please the government in order to seek benefits after his impending retirement in December 2019. Given the circumstances under which he was appointed in the first place – after superseding two senior Army Commanders who were widely viewed as equally deserving – there is also an appearance of his now being eager please the government in return.
In such a scenario, there is an urgent need to re-establish an environment of trust from both sides. The idea way of doing this is for the COAS to actually identify and penalise any individuals actually indulging in malpractices mentioned by him. He should also come out with a categorial statement renouncing any post retirement benefit from the government in order to retain or regain the confidence of his command. Failure to do so, or worse, accepting any such position post retirement, would permanently corrode his personal reputation as well as the faith in the august office of the COAS.
As teachers go, he was unusual. A short, bulky Khalsa with the customary bushy beard, with eyebrows to match, Naib Risaldar Gulzar Singh was my D&M (Driving and Maintenance) instructor when I joined the Regiment back in 1990. He was universally known as Nanda Sahib, although that wasn’t his actual name. Apparently when he had joined the regiment, Gulzari Lal Nanda was the caretaker Prime Minister. With their unique brand of humour and logic, his seniors in the Khalsa squadron had christened Gulzar Singh as ‘Nanda’ because of their similar sounding first name. Much later, when he was promoted to a JCO, the ‘Sahib’ was automatically added to the alias. This I learnt much later, and went through the first few years in the Regiment believing that was his actual name.
Back then, fresh out of the academy and with more stars in my eyes than on my shoulders, my status was no better than one of the young recruits. Although I was an officer, duly commissioned by the President and gazetted by the Government of India, in the eyes of the regiment I was more of a liability than an asset. In order to transform from a red ink entry into a blue ink one, I had to first learn all about the internal and external workings of our equipment – Tank T-55 105mm (Upgunned). The formal training I would receive six months later when I attended the Young Officers’ course at Ahmadnagar. But meanwhile there was the pre-course – a preparatory cadre conducted in the unit garages.
Instructors were a scarce resource, so I was clubbed with an ongoing cadre for new recruits. Classes were conducted on the three main aspects of the tankmanship – Gunnery, Radio and Driving & Maintenance. Nanda Sahib was our instructor for the last. He had his own brand of teaching, which, though unorthodox. was very effective in not only conveying what he wanted to, but also making the lesson stick in our minds.
For instance, I can never ever forget the functioning of a ‘one way valve’ thanks to Nanda Sahib. He was taking a class on ‘Fording’. This is an exercise that tanks undertake to cross shallow, fordable bodies of water with a little bit of preparation. For this, a ‘one way’ or ‘butterfly’ valve is fitted on the exhaust outlet of the tank. This is a spring loaded valve, which prevents water from entering the exhaust manifold of the engine. The strength of the springs is so calibrated that the pressure of the smoke coming out from the exhaust opens it, thus allowing the smoke to escape. But otherwise it remains tightly shut, thus preventing ingress of water.
Nanda Sahib explained this with a diagram, and then took us on the tank to demonstrate. He got us to fix the butterfly valve on the tank, and started the engine to demonstrate how the flap of the valve opened every time he pressed the accelerator to increase the flow of smoke. But there was this one recruit who just couldn’t fathom how, if the smoke was able to get out, the water didn’t get in. When all the scientific principles at his disposal failed, Nanda resorted to his rustic logic, which went as follows.
(Those of you who can, imagine the following conversation in ‘theth’ Punjabi. For those not fortunate enough to know that language, the translation will convey the sense though I’m afraid it won’t do complete justice to the tone and tenor.)
Recruit : But Sahib, I still don’t understand. How can it be that the smoke comes out but the water doesn’t go in?
Nanda : Do you have a pond in your village?
Recruit : Yes.
Nanda : Do you bathe in it?
Recruit : Yes.
Nanda : Have you ever farted while bathing in the pond?
Recruit : (sheepishly) Yes.
Nanda : Did the water go in?
The recruit had this sudden look of enlightenment on his face.
As for me, I learnt a little more than Medium Fording and functioning of one way valve. That, of course, I will never forget. But what I also learnt is that a good instructor is one who is capable of getting the point across in a manner the student understands it. So what if its not part of the lesson plan.
