Himalayan Blunder – The Sequel

Posted on September 5, 2012 by sword

india-china

If the report about PMO ‘stalling’ the raising of Mountain Strike Corps for apprehension of ‘sending the wrong signal to the Chinese’ is true, it’s ridiculous on two accounts – the decision itself, and the manner in which it seems to have been taken. In fact, it is a sorry commentary on the way issues of vital national security are dealt with in this country.

Let’s talk about manner of taking decisions first. Raisings forming part of the long term force structuring are not something likely to have been dreamt up by some General in a weaker moment. One assumes that the decision would have been backed by adequate debate and deliberations within the Service Headquarters. Consultations with other services should have followed. The case should then have been presented at various levels including to the Defence Minister, National Security Council and Cabinet Committee on Security. In depth and independent analyses of all aspects should have taken place at each of these levels. The circle of stakeholders and related inputs would have widened at each successive level, with the CCS presumably having requisite perspective to evaluate the connotations and consequences of such raisings on the economy and diplomacy.

The facts that one Division of the proposed Strike Corps has already been raised, and approval for raising of the Corps accorded two years back, as reported in the same news item, indicate that the matter had moved beyond deliberation phase. If this has been done without a process akin to that described above, it is amazing. Conversely, if the decision is being reversed now despite such a process having taken place, it would imply either that drastic changes have taken place in the strategic scenario and our relationship with China in the past two years, or that the initial decision was taken without due deliberation. Since there is no obvious sign of the former, one would have to regrettably conclude that the latter is true. One shudders to think that our strategic vision is so short sighted that it cannot even look beyond two years.

Now let’s examine the merits of the decision itself. Obviously the mandarins in PMO have a deep insight into the current dynamics of Sino Indian relations. As per the PMO, “China in the last few last years has not increased its troop strength along the 4,500 km long Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) and any accretions by India will prove counter-productive as both the countries are holding regular dialogue to resolve the vexed boundary dispute” . But as any layman who reads open source material would be able to reckon, China enjoys an overwhelming infrastructural edge over India. It can rapidly build up its forces along the LAC, moving them from the hinterland over roads and railway lines constructed in the last few decades for this very purpose. India, on the other hand, does not have this luxury. Not only is the infrastructure inimical to rapid troop buildup, the fact that we have to simultaneously guard our Western border zealously limits the quantum of troops that can be spared. Also, the ‘regular dialogue’ has been on much before the decision of force accretions was taken, so it is difficult to understand what has changed.

It has been expressed on this blog earlier that the boundary dispute with China needs to be sorted out with a pragmatic approach by both sides regarding respective perceptions and interests. Yet, negotiating from a position of strength is an imperative. To that end, enhancing our capabilities to meet any eventuality does not undermine the dialogue – it strengthens our position on the dialogue table.

It is not conceivable that the PMO is convinced that the fact that we are talking to China guarantees that we will not be facing any kind of adverse military action anytime in the future. If they are, it would be instructive for them to read the following passage from Ramachandra Guha’s epic ‘India After Gandhi’:-

“In a note circulated to the cabinet, He (Nehru) thought it a pity that Tibet could not be’ saved’. Yet he considered it ‘exceedingly unlikely’ that India would now face an attack from China; it was ‘inconceivable that they would undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas’. He thought that ‘the idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather ‘naive’.

History proved who the naïve one was. It would be a cliché to talk about what happens to those who choose to ignore history. Should we just keep our fingers crossed?

Posted in Boundary Dispute, China, Military | Tagged , , , , , | 10 Comments

An Officer and a Gentleman

Posted on August 25, 2012 by sword

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Recent cases of mutinous behaviour by troops, including increasing incidences of assault on their own officers, have caused much comment in the media and within the circle of observers of military affairs. Much has been written about the possible causes. Growing chasm between officers and troops, caused by a shortage of officers, has been pegged as a major reason. The growing aspirations of the Jawans in the changed socio-economic environment is another. While all that is quite true, it is ironic that the problem is not only the increasing gap between officers and the men they command. It is, interestingly, also the DECREASE in this gap. Let me explain how.

The army is a hierarchical organization out of necessity, with the clarity and rigidity of the chain of command being an essential functional parameter. The system mandates that an order given by a senior officer has to be followed. There is no scope for discussing or questioning orders – specially in operations, despite the fact that execution of an order in this case may more often than not imply putting one’s life and limbs at risk. For a soldier to act on such an order unhesitatingly, he needs to be sure of two things.

Firstly, he has to have implicit faith and trust in the officer’s intention and integrity. That the officer will act in the best interest of the cause as well as in the soldiers’ own best interest within the bounds of serving that cause. For example, this means that the officer will not expose them to unwarranted risk for the sake of personal glory and awards. Secondly, he has to have faith that the officer is more competent and better informed than him to take that decision. If he is not convinced of this, he is likely to question the prudence of the officer’s decisions and fear the possible outcome of acting on them.

Faith and trust is gained over a period of time in interaction with the men and admittedly the shortage of officers and associated issues has resulted in officers spending lesser time in direct interaction with troops. But in my opinion, quality is more important than quantity when it comes to time spent in building this trust. It is less about how much time, but more about what is done doing during this time. If a young officer is on small arms firing ranges with his troops, is he standing at the firing point coaching the firing details, running up to check targets with them every time? Or is he sitting under a fly tent or a tree and watching from a distance? Besides, it is not only the conduct during time spent with the troops. An officer’s conduct at all times contributes towards trust building – or loss of trust. How does he conduct himself on and off parade, or what is his attitude towards use (or abuse) of regimental and government property. A combat unit is not unlike a joint family, where nothing remains hidden for long.

The point is that shortage of officers resulting in less time being spent with troops is not necessarily the only or even primary reason of decline in the level trust between officers and men in some units. The overall standards of deportment of the officers possibly has a lot to do with it.

The second aspect is a little more complicated. Traditionally, there was a distinct difference between the backgrounds of officers and men – social, economic and educational. This gap led the soldiers to believe that the officer was “better” than them and therefore qualified to lead them. While it may sound elitist, it is indeed a hard fact. So, although the officers and men of those times shared a close bond which withstood tests of time and extreme dangers, there was always an unspoken but clearly recognized gap between them. It was the acknowledgement of this gap that formed the superstructure on which the chain of command is based.

But today the gap in backgrounds of officers and men has narrowed from both ends – the officers and men are coming from less dissimilar backgrounds socially as well as economically. Even in terms of levels of education and awareness, the Jawans are closer to the officers than ever before.

This proximity on one hand, and the difference in status, emoluments and quality of life, on the other hand, is not easily accepted by the new generation of soldiers. The unacceptability is compounded by the fact that officers do not necessarily display the desired degree of probity and trustworthiness in their dealings. Thus, in instances where Jawans perceive high handed behaviour or unfairness on the part of their officer, they resort to actions ‘prejudicial to good order and military discipline’.

Amongst the factors discussed above, shortage of officers and growing similarities in the backgrounds of officers and men are not likely to be altered in the foreseeable future. What can be changed is the manner in which the officers prove themselves both – worthy of trust, and more competent than the men they command.

There needs to be a concerted effort in the Academies, Young Officers courses and in the units, to sensitize budding and young officers about these aspects. Greater emphasis needs to be paid to developing key military competencies amongst junior officers, and all officers need to be ‘officer like’ in their deportment at all times. Else, if this slide continues, many more incidents like Samba and Leh are inevitable.

Posted in Blogitorial, Military, Shortage of officers, Traditions, Values | Tagged , , , , , , | 27 Comments

Sadda Haq Aithe Rakh

Posted on August 9, 2012 by sword

vijaykumar-grand-welcome

My understanding of the way performance and rewards work is as follows. Performance deserves reward, commensurate to achievement and based on established norms. The organisation  enables performance through provision of resources and infrastructure, while the performer provides sweat and talent – knowledge & skills – towards attaining success. Having attained success, the performer justly expects reward. Apropos Subedar Vijay Kumar, so far so good. But what if the performer, even without waiting for the reward system to kick in, starts making demands for rewards with  a underlying threat of quitting the organisation if the demands are not met?

There is no taking away from Vijay’s laudable achievement, and he truly deserves to be rewarded in the best possible manner. However, his conduct in making an announcement through the media, even before landing back in the country, that he would quit the Army in case he is not promoted to a level equivalent to an IAS officer, has been a little jarring. The pre-emptive ultimatum was a demand for reward, made with a gun held on the Army’s head. Implied was the insinuation  – ” now that I have arrived, the Army needs me more than I need the Army”. What Vijay does not comprehend is that no matter what his achievements and contribution, an individual can never be bigger than the organisation. Specially in a situation where the organisation’s support and nurturing has been a vital factor behind the  achievement, such an attitude smacks of arrogance and ungratefulness.
Doubtlessly, Vijay’s status as a Subedar would probably not be in keeping with his new found standing and affluence as an Olympic medallist – a problem not faced by then Maj Rajyawardhan Rathore who won an Olympic medal the last time around. But expecting the Army to supersede existing norms and precedences to overcome this disparity is not fair. An anticipatory threat of resignation is even more unfair because it presupposes a few thing. First that the Army is obliged to elevate him to an officer’s rank. And second that such a thing will not happen in the normal course – borne out by his statement that he hasn’t received a promotion in the past six years. Glossing over the fact that the same Army has promoted him four times over the rank he would ordinarily have held. Most significantly, it also presupposes that now onwards he does not really need the Army’s backing and support to pursue his sport.
But by his immature utterings, arising probably out of immaturity and sense of insecurity, Vijay has marred his moment of triumph in the eyes of many like me. Had he been a little more mature, he would probably have waited for the Army to declare what they planned for him. Then, if that did not meet his aspirations, he could have represented, or put in his papers and taken up one of the many opportunities that are available to him.
The Army authorities find themselves in an acutely embarrassing position as a result of Vijay’s immature premature statements. On one hand they are constrained to follow the rules regarding out of turn promotions. On the other hand they would not like to lose a poster boy, a potential source of motivation for recruitment. Now, even if Vijay is promoted through a special dispensation, the Army would come out looking as if it buckled under pressure and did something they would not otherwise have done. Any which way you look at it, the Army comes out being embarrassed.
Vijay Kumar is not the first outstanding sportsman that the armed forces have produced. Olympians like Maj Dhyan Chand (who did rise from the ranks to retire as a Maj ) and Col Rajyawardhan Rathore (who has got promotions only as per his turn) to Everest summiteers, to unsung heroes like Commander Dilip Donde – the first Indian, and amongst a select club of about 175 people world wide to carry out solo circumnavigation of the earth in a sailboat– who also, incidentally did not receive any out of turn promotions. Nor is he the last – people will continue to make the forces proud with their achievements long after Vijay’s moment in the limelight is over.
The best way for the Army to deal with the situation now would be to announce the rightful rewards due to Vinay – promotion as per rules, and also an AVSM in keeping with what it gave Rajyawardhan Rathore. That done, it should allow Vijay Kumar to go in his quest for pastures greener than the Olive Greens.
Posted in Blogitorial, Politics | Tagged , , , , , , , | 53 Comments